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I. Introduction
In April 1996 Congress passed the Line Item Veto Act of 19961
(hereinafter "Line Item Veto Act") which President William Jefferson
Clinton signed into law.2 The Line Item Veto Act gives the President3 the
power to cancel portions of an appropriations or tax bill after he has signed
the bill into law.a The Line Item Veto Act is the product of a decade of
debate on the line item veto power. Proponents assert that giving the
President such power allows him to cut Congress' wasteful spending,
while opponents argue that the line item veto power permits the President
to legislate and control the nation's treasury.5
This Note assesses the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act. In
order to determine whether the Act is constitutional, one must understand
the nature of the power it grants to the President. The line item veto power
has three potential sources under our constitutional system. First, the
power may derive from congressional authorization for the President to
amend or repeal laws, and thus constitutes an essentially legislative power.
Characterizing the line item veto power as such implicates the lawmaking
provisions set out in Article I, Section 7 of the Constitution. 6 The Consti-
tution does not, however, explicitly give the President more than a veto
over legislation.
Second, the line item veto authority may constitute a means of effec-
tuating the President's Article I veto power over legislation presented to
him by Congress. 7  Currently, members of Congress employ legislative
tactics which prevent the President from effectively using his veto author-
ity.8 The Line Item Veto Act permits the President to circumvent congres-
sional tactics and cancel singular items in an omnibus appropriations bill
so that he can make effective use of his veto power.
1. Pub. L. No. 104-130, 110 Stat. 1200 (1996).
2. See Toni Locy, Line Item Veto Law Challenged, S.F. CHRoN., Jan. 3, 1997, at A3.
3. This Note refers to the President of the United States in a masculine form since there has
been no female President to this date.
4. 2 U.S.C. § 691 (1997).
5. See Locy, supra note 2.
6. The second clause of Article I, Section 7 states that "[e]very Bill which shall have
passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented
to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it,
with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated .... " U.S. CONsT. art. I, §7.
7. See id.
8. See infra notes 184-185 and accompanying text.
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Finally, the line item veto power may be construed as congressional
authorization for the President to exercise an impoundment power.9 When
the President impounds funds, he refuses to abide by Congress' mandate to
spend or tax, thereby nullifying Congress' spending priorities. There is no
explicit constitutional basis for impoundment authority, but courts and
commentators have long suggested that such a power exists. The depiction
of the line item veto power as impoundment power raises questions re-
garding the extent of Congress' delegation authority and whether such
power is included within the President's mandate to execute the laws.
In evaluating the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto Act, this Note
explores the three potential characterizations of the line item veto power
and the constitutionality of the law under each characterization. After this
introduction, Part II of this Note contains four subsections that discuss the
evolution of the line item veto power. First, subsection A describes the
political and economic setting in which the Line Item Veto Act was
passed. Second, subsection B outlines the provisions of the Line Item
Veto Act. Finally, subsections C and D summarize the Supreme Court's
holding in the lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Line Item
Veto Act and examines who will be a proper plaintiff in future suits. Part
III assesses the constitutionality of the line item veto as presidential law-
making authority, and concludes that while Congress can authorize the
President to make laws to carry out Congress' intent, the Line Item Veto
Act is not such a permissible delegation of lawmaking authority. Instead,
the Line Item Veto Act empowers the President to independently legislate
contrary to constitutional provisions and Congress' legislative mandate.
Part IV demonstrates that if the line item veto power functions as an ef-
fectuation of the President's Article I veto authority, such authority is un-
constitutional because it encroaches on Congress' legislative powers. Part
V reveals that if the Line Item Veto Act's veto power constitutes presiden-
tial impoundment power, the Constitution does not explicitly bar such
authority. Although the impoundment argument is the strongest one in
support of the Line Item Veto Act, it ultimately fails because the line item
veto power impermissibly tilts the balance of power between the President
and Congress in favor of the President. In conclusion, this Note explains
that regardless of the characterization or source of the line item veto
power, the Line Item Veto Act is an unconstitutional violation of the sepa-
ration of powers. Members of Congress should not rely on the Line Item
Veto Act to control their excessive budgetary spending. Instead, they
9. This Note defines "impoundment" power as the authority of the President to use his dis-
cretion in executing appropriations and tax laws legislated by Congress.
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should achieve fiscal discipline by exercising self-restraint and promul-
gating rules to govern their own self-interested behavior.
H. Evolution of the Line Item Veto
A. The Need for Presidential Line Item Veto Power and the Passage of
the Line Item Veto Act of 1996
Although Congress appears recently to have regained control over the
federal budget deficit and national debt, during the past two decades both
figures have escalated exponentially. Despite Congress' attempts to re-
strain its spending and reign in the spiraling national debt,10 the national
debt has quintupled in the past 15 years as a result of unrestrained annual
deficits." It took the United States 192 years of operation (from 1789 to
1981) to accumulate its first trillion dollars of debt.' 2  However, since
1981, regardless of whether there has been a Republican or Democratic
President, the national debt has continued to rise every year.' 3 As of Janu-
ary 29, 1998, the national debt was $494,031,011,931.75.4
The huge debt is commonly blamed on the federal budgeting process,
which leads to overspending. Critics attribute one source of the break-
down in the budgeting process to Congress members' preoccupation with
re-election and their susceptibility to the influence of special interests.
15
Congress members are often accused of logrolling, that is, voting for one
another's pet projects in order to gain their constituents' favor.' Conse-
10. The national debt is the sum of all of the accumulated deficits since the beginning of this
nation. Each year, the deficit contributes to and increases the debt of this country. However, if
the nation's annual economic growth is large enough to sustain the debt, the debt is not of great
concern.
11. See H.R. REP. No. 104-11(11), at 7 (1995). On August 6, 1997, President Clinton an-
nounced the current state of the deficit. He forecast a smaller-than-expected $37 billion federal
deficit for fiscal year 1997, which ended September 30, 1997. This projection would be the low-
est since 1974, when the government shortfall was $6 billion. See Nancy Benac, Deficit to Hit
23-yr. Low; Clinton Forecasts $37 Billion Shortfall, CHI. SuN-TIMES, Aug. 6, 1997, at 1.
12. See H.R. REP. No. 104-11(1I),at7(1995).
13. See id. In the fiscal years 1991-92, when Republican George Bush was President, the
national debt increased from $3,665,303,351,697.03 to $4,064,620,655,521.66. During the last
two years of Democratic President Clinton's first term, the national debt rose from
$4,973,982,900,709.39 in fiscal year 1995 to $5,224,810,939,135.73 in fiscal year 1996. See
Department of Treasury, The Bureau of the Public Debt, The Public Debt To The Penny (visited
Sept. 30, 1997) <http://www.publicdebt.treas.gov/opd/opdpenny.htm>.
14. Department of Treasury, The Bureau of the Public Debt, The Public Debt To The Penny
(visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http:lwww.publicdebt.treas.gov/opdlopdpenny.htm>.
15. See, e.g., Paul R. Q. Wolfson, Is A Presidential Item Veto Constitutional?, 96 YALE L.J.
838 (1987); Alan J. Dixon, The Case for the Line Item Veto, 1 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB.
POL'Y 207, 211-17 (1985) [hereinafter Dixon, Case].
16. See RICHARD A. WATSON, PRESIDENTIAL VETOES AND PUBLIC POLICY 171 (1993).
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quently, appropriations bills are often filled with pork-barrel legislation 17
which does not benefit the nation as a whole, but only the districts of indi-
vidual members of Congress. 8 Because these projects are slipped into
omnibus appropriations bills t9 that fund valid projects, the President must
often make the difficult decision of either vetoing an entire bill that in-
cludes beneficial programs or signing a bill that includes projects for spe-
cial interests.2 When Congress sent President Truman such an appropria-
tions bill, which it knew would be approved even though it contained items
which were not in the national interest and bore no relationship to the main
purpose of the legislation, Truman is said to have called the practice "leg-
islative blackmail. 21
One example of pork-barrel legislation is the Revenue Act of 1992,
22
introduced to create enterprise zones in the aftermath of the Los Angeles
riots.23 As the bill made its way through Congress, legislators inserted
more than fifty special tax breaks which exceeded the allocation for the
enterprise zones themselves. The tax breaks included special exemptions
for certain rural postal carriers, special rules for Federal Express pilots,
deductions for operators of licensed cotton warehouses, and exemptions
for certain manufacturers of small firearms.24 Although President Clinton
17. Pork-barrel legislation refers to legislation which has been passed by "securing votes for
legislation by which one congressman conditions his support for a colleague's bill on the col-
league's support for his own. The resulting multi-faceted appropriations bill is then presented to
the President" Diane-Michele Krasnow, The Imbalance of Power and the Presidential Veto: A
Case for the Item Veto, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 583, 602, n.124 (1991).
18. See WATSON, supra note 16.
19. "Omnibus appropriations bills are an amalgamation of assorted legislation grouped to-
gether and presented in a single bill or resolution." Krasnow, supra note 17, at 584 n.6.
20. See WATSON, supra note 16.
21. See 141 CONG. REC. S4236 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Coats).
22. See H.R. REP. No. 104-11(f1), at 18 (1995).
23. See id.
24. See id. Legislators' inclusion of such tax benefits illustrates that the federal budget is an
example of the tragedy of the commons. The "tragedy of the commons" is an economic concept
used to describe the "commons" which are property for which there is widespread public access,
but no private ownership. That is, the public at large owns the property and no private property
rights exist in the property. The "tragedy" in the commons occurs because "all men rush [to
maximize the benefit of the property], each pursuing his own best interest.... " Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968), reprinted in RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR.,
ECONOMIC REGULATION: CASES AND MATERIAIs 24-25 (1994). For example, the national
parks in the United States are "commons" which are shared by the nation's people. Since no one
person owns the land, everyone uses the forests and parks as they desire without any incentive to
limit their use for fear of excessive use. On the other hand, if private individuals owned the
lands, they would possess greater incentive to regulate the land's use in order to preserve it. Pri-
vate owners would not race to reap all of the benefits first. In the same way, the federal budget
falls prey to individuals and interest groups which fight for their slice of the federal pie without
an eye toward the overall effect on the nation's fiscal health. Because no one person owns the
budget, the common owners desire to maximize their proportionate gain. Unfortunately,
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vetoed the Revenue Act of 1992,25 a President does not always have the
option to exercise his veto power against outlandish spending or tax bene-
fits if the same bill funds other necessary programs.
In order to combat growth of the national deficit and increasing con-
gressional misbehavior, numerous Presidents have requested the power to
exercise a line item veto that would allow rejection of individual parts of a
proposed appropriations bill, while enacting the remainder as law.26 In his
1992 State of the Union address, President Bush called for Congress to
give him the power to veto items such as funding for a Lawrence Welk
Museum that was included in a 1991 appropriations bill for the Depart-
ment of Agriculture.27 President Clinton also campaigned for a line item
veto, claiming that he could decrease spending by $9.8 billion over four
years if Congress gave him the line item veto power.2
Over the past two decades, the American public has consistently sup-
ported legislation which would grant the President line item veto power in
order to reduce the federal deficit. The response to a 1992 joint poll by
NBC and the Wall Street Journal showed that sixty-eight percent of citi-
zens favored giving the President a line item veto so that he could curtail
wasteful spending.29 In a poll conducted on November 28-29, 1994, by
CNN, USA Today and Gallup, seventy-seven percent of those polled stated
that they would endorse legislation that gave the President such power.
30
Not surprisingly, although various bills have been introduced, Con-
gress has traditionally been reluctant to confer any form of line item veto
power on the President. 31 During the 1980s, Congress considered three
statutory approaches for line item veto authority.32 The first, "separate en-
rollment," would require that each item in a spending or revenue bill be en-
rolled as a separate bill, thus allowing the President to exercise his execu-
"[f]reedom in a commons brings ruin to all" and unfettered budgeting practices will ultimately
lead to financial ruin for the United States. Id.
25. See H.R. REP. No. 104-11(I1), at 8 (1995).
26. Many modem Presidents, regardless of party affiliation, have stated support for the line
item veto. Among them are Clinton, Bush, Reagan, Ford, Eisenhower, Truman and Franklin D.
Roosevelt. Ulysses S. Grant was the first President to openly seek an item veto. See WATSON,
supra note 16, at 154-55; S. REP. No. 104-9, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 859,
864.
27. See JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM AND EFFECIVE GOVERNMENT
281 (1992); George F. Will, Lawrence Welk and Line Items, WASH. POST, Feb. 23, 1992, at C7.
28. See S. REP. No. 104-9, at 5 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 859, 864.
29. See H.R. REP. No. 104-11(1), at7-8 (1995).
30. See id. at 7-8.
31. Since Ulysses Grant first proposed the idea in 1873, more than 150 legislative proposals
have requested that Congress give the President the authority to veto individual parts of a bill.
Until 1996, Congress rejected every such suggestion. See 142 CONG. REC. S2966 (daily ed. Mar.
27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Levin).
32. See S. REP. No. 104-9, at 5-6 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 859, 864-65.
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tive veto on any of the individual items. 33 The second, "expedited rescis-
sion," would establish fast-track procedures for the consideration of the
President's proposals to rescind the budget authority provided in appro-
priations acts or to repeal tax expenditures in revenue acts.34 These pro-
posals would not go into effect unless passed by a majority of each House
and signed into law.35 The last approach, "enhanced rescission," would
authorize the President to take unilateral action to repeal budget authority
provided in a spending bill or to cancel tax expenditures in revenue acts.36
Congress would have to pass a separate law in order to overturn the Presi-
dent's cancellation,37 and because the President would presumably veto a
law reversing his own rescissions, a two-thirds vote of each House would
be necessary to overturn his actions.38 As of 1994, Congress had rejected
all proposed legislation granting the President any form of line item veto
power. 9
In 1995, the Republican-controlled Congress adopted a more favor-
able attitude toward legislation granting the President item veto power due,
in part, to Congress' "Contract with America," which called for deficit re-
duction.4° On January 4, 1995, Senator Robert Dole (R-Kan.) introduced
S.4, the Legislative Line Item Veto Act, which, if passed, would give the
President enhanced rescission power.41 On January 18, 1995, the Senate
Budget Committee held hearings on the bill and adopted two amend-
ments.42 The committee ordered the bill reported without recommendation
on February 14, 1995. 43 Throughout 1995 and at the beginning of 1996,
Congress further deliberated on S.4 and extensively debated, among other
33. See id. at 5.
34. See S. REP. No. 104-9, at 6 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 859, 865.
35. See id.
36. See S. REP. No. 104-9, at 5-6 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 859, 864-65.
37. See id
38. See U.S. CONST. arL I, § 7.
39. In 1990, the Senate Budget Committee defeated two proposals by Senator Armstrong:
one for separate enrollment authority and the other granting the President enhanced rescission
authority. Thereafter in 1994, the Senate Budget Committee did not take action on two House-
passed bills which provided for expedited procedures for consideration of the President's pro-
posed rescissions. See S. REP. No. 104-9, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 859, 867.
The General Accounting Office estimated in 1992 that a line item veto could have eliminated
$70.7 billion in pork-barrel spending between 1984 and 1989. See 141 CONG. REc. S4241 (daily
ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).
40. See Tampa Wire Service Report, Line of Power: New Veto for President Ok'd, TAMPA
TRIB., Mar. 29, 1996, at 1.
41. See S. REP. No. 104-9, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 859, 867.
42. One amendment was introduced by Senator Domenici (R-NM) to end the provisions of
the bill in 2002. Senators Snowe (R-ME) and Conrad (D-ND) proposed the second amendment
which established a "lockbox," a provision which assures that any savings from the President's
rescissions are devoted to deficit reduction. See id.
43. See id,
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things, its constitutionality. Some members of Congress, such as Senator
Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.), alleged that the bill implicitly vitiated the
separation of powers because it transferred one of the most important Arti-
cle I legislative powers, the authority to make or rewrite laws, to the Ex-
ecutive Branch.4 Ultimately, Congress failed to conclude whether the bill
was constitutional, instead, it amended the bill to provide for expedited ju-
dicial review 45 to allow the federal judiciary to determine the bill's consti-
tutionality. Subsequently, President Clinton signed the line item veto bill
into law on April 9, 1996.46 The Line Item Veto Act went into effect on
January 1, 1997.47
While most members of Congress, President Clinton, and the public at
large have praised the Act's passage as a positive step toward controlling
government spending and decreasing the federal deficit, other members of
Congress and some scholars claim that the Line Item Veto Act "effectuated
an unprecedented and unconstitutional allocation of power from the legis-
lative branch to the executive." 48  Months after President Clinton began
using the line item veto, several lawmakers introduced bills to repeal the
Act.4
9
B. Summary of the Line Item Veto Act of 1996
The Line Item Veto Act amends the Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Control Act of 197450 (hereinafter "Impoundment Control
Act"),5 1 which had provided the President with limited powers to impound
appropriations and taxes by authorizing two types of presidential im-
poundments.5 2 One type, a "deferral," allowed for a delay in the expendi-
ture of appropriated funds. 3 The second type, a "rescission," provided for
44. See 142 CONG. REC. S2942 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd).
45. This provision states that the Line Item Veto Act may be challenged in the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia. 2 U.S.C. § 692 (a)(1) (1997). The District Court's
decision may be appealed directly to the United States Supreme Court. See 2 U.S.C. § 692(b)
(1997).
46. See Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S.4, 31 WEEKLY COMP.
PRES. Doc. 637 (Apr. 9, 1996).
47. See 143 CONG. REc. S569-04 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 1997) (statement of Sen. Moynihan).
48. Id.
49. Associated Press, Senators Lead Bid to Repeal Line Item Veto IlMoynihan, Byrd Tar-
get 'Unconstitutional Act', ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEwS, Oct. 25, 1997, at 49A. In the Senate,
Senators Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.) and Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.) introduced legislation to
repeal the President's line item veto on October 24, 1997. See id. Representative David Skaggs
initiated similar legislation in the House of Representatives on October 9, 1997. See id.
50. Pub. L. No.93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974).
51. See S. REP. NO. 104-9 at 9 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 859, 866-67.
52. See WATSON, supra note 16, at 161.
53. See id.
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a permanent cancellation of appropriations.5 4  Upon exercising his im-
poundment power, the President would send Congress a special message
informing it of his action.55 Either House of Congress could disapprove a
deferral at any time. If, however, a President's proposed rescission was
not approved by both Houses within forty-five days of the President's
submission, the affected funds would be automatically released to be
spent.57 These deferral and rescission powers were invalidated after LN.S.
v. Chadha5 8 and City of New Haven v. United States59 on the ground that
such powers violated the constitutional principles of bicameralism and pre-
sentment.60
Not only was the Impoundment Control Act unconstitutional; it was
also inefficient. It inherently encouraged congressional inaction and de-
lay,6' because Congress was not obligated to consider or respond to any of
the President's proposals. In fact, Congress often ignored Presidential
proposals to rescind funds.62 From 1974 to 1995, Presidents recommended
$72.8 billion in rescissions, and of that amount, Congress agreed only to
$22.9 billion.63 Thus, the Impoundment Control Act did not give any real
power to curb congressional excesses.
The Line Item Veto Act, by contrast, gives the President more effec-
tive authority in the form of "enhanced rescission" power. That is, the
Line Item Veto Act gives the President unilateral authority to "cancel in
whole" any dollar amount of discretionary budget authority,64 any item of
new direct spending,65 or any limited tax benefit" from "any bill or joint
54. See id.
55. See id.
56. See iL
57. See id.
58. 462 U.S. 919, 956-58 (1983). Although Chadha did not directly address impoundment
authority, in ruling that Congress' one house legislative veto was unconstitutional, the Court
stated that the provisions of Article I of the Constitution require bicameralism and presentment on
all legislation. See id.
59. 809 F.2d 900, 909 (D.C. Cir. 1987). In City of New Haven, the court held that the two
veto provisions were inseverable and invalidated the entire Impoundment Control Act. Id.
60. See WATSON, supra note 16, at 161-62.
61. See H. REP. 104-11(I), at 8-9 (1995).
62. See id. at 9.
63. See id.
64. "Dollar amount of discretionary budget authority" means "the entire dollar amount of
budget authority - (i) specified in an appropriation law ...; (ii) represented separately in any ta-
ble, chart, or explanatory text included in the statement of managers or the governing committee
report accompanying such law; (iii) required to be allocated for a specific program, project, or
activity in a law .... 2 U.S.C. § 691e(7)(A) (1997).
65. "Item of new direct spending" is "any specific provision of law that is estimated to re-
sult in an increase in budget authority or outlays for direct spending relative to the most recent
levels calculated pursuant to [section 257 of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985 [2 U.S.C. § 907]]." 2 U.S.C. § 691e(8) (1997). "Direct spending" is "the budget
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resolution that [the President] has . . signed into law pursuant to Article I,
Section 7, of the Constitution .... 67 However, the President's power is
not absolute. Not only does Congress have the ultimate power to override
a presidential rescission, but the President must also meet certain statutory
requirements in order to exercise his authority. He may cancel an item of
spending or tax benefit only if he determines that it will "reduce the Fed-
eral budget deficit," "not impair any essential Government functions," and
"not harm the national interest." 68  He must decide within five days of
signing a bill into law whether he wants to repeal an item of spending.
69
During this five-day period, he must send both the House of Representa-
tives and the Senate a "special message"70 notifying them of any rescis-
sion.71 The President's cancellation of any dollar amount becomes effec-
tive on the date when the House of Representatives and the Senate receive
his special message.72
The Line Item Veto Act provides Congress with the power to override
the President's rescission. Congress can enact a "disapproval bill,
' 73
which must be passed with bicameral consideration, presentment to the
President, and a two-thirds override of the President's veto, assuming that
the President would veto any disapproval bill that attempts to invalidate his
authority provided by law (other than by an appropriation law), entitlement authority, and the
food stamp program." 2 U.S.C. § 691e(5) (1997).
66. "Limited tax benefit" is "any revenue-losing provision which provides a Federal tax de-
duction, credit, exclusion, or preference to 100 or fewer beneficiaries under Title 26 in any fiscal
year for which the provision is in effect; and any Federal tax provision which provides temporary
or permanent transitional relief for 10 or fewer beneficiaries in any fiscal year .... " 2 U.S.C. §
691e(9)(A) (1997).
67. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)(1-3) (1997).
68. 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)(3)(A)(i-iii) (1997).
69. See 2 U.S.C. § 691(a)(B) (1997). While these standards are limitations on the Presi-
dent's veto power, the President can easily satisfy them.
70. A "special message" from the President shall specify: (1) the amount of the item can-
celed; (2) "the determinations required under § 691(a) ... and any supporting material;" (3) "the
reasons for the cancellation;" (4) "to the maximum extent practicable, the estimated fiscal, eco-
nomic, and budgetary effect of the cancellation;" and (5) "all facts, circumstances and considera-
tions relating to or bearing upon the cancellation, and to the maximum extent practicable, the es-
timated effect of the cancellation upon the objects, purposes and programs for which the canceled
authority was provided .... 2 U.S.C. § 691a(b)(1)(A-E) (1997).
71. The President must transmit each special message to the House of Representatives and
the Senate on the same calendar day. 2 U.S.C. § 691a(c)(1) (1997).
72. See 2 U.S.C. § 691b(a) (1997).
73. A "disapproval bill" is a "bill or joint resolution which only disapproves one or more
cancellations of dollar amounts of discretionary budget authority, items of new direct spending,
or limited tax benefits in a special message transmitted by the President .... 2 U.S.C. § 691e
(6)(1997). The Act provides for a simple format for the disapproval bill which must be followed.
See § 691e(6)(A-C).
I'Vol. 25:119
Fall 1997] THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LINE ITEM VETO 129
item cancellation(s).74 There are also procedures for expedited considera-
tion of disapproval bills in each House. For example, in order for a disap-
proval bill to be considered, it must be introduced no later than the fifth
calendar day of session after receipt of the special message, and the review
period lasts only thirty calendar days, beginning on the first calendar day
after the special message is received.75 Thus, unlike the Impoundment
Control Act, the Line Item Veto Act requires Congress to take swift action
to reverse the President's rescission.
The Line Item Veto Act also restricts the extent of the President's
power in various ways. First, there is a "lockbox" provision which assures
that any savings from the President's cancellations are devoted to deficit
reduction, thereby restraining the President from applying the funds of a
rescinded item to a program of his choice.76 Second, the Line Item Veto
Act requires the President to eliminate only dollar amounts specifically
identified in a bill or those represented separately in a table, chart, or ex-
planatory text included in the committee report.77 Such "fencing language"
in each appropriation bill prevents the President from arbitrarily deter-
mining the dollar amount of an item to veto.78 Finally, the Line Item Veto
Act limits the duration of the President's power. The line item veto
authority ends on January 1, 2005, or when the federal deficit is elimi-
nated, whichever occurs first.
79
Furthermore, the Line Item Veto Act purports to authorize legal chal-
lenges by any harmed individuals or parties. The Line Item Veto Act also
74. See 2 U.S.C. § 691d (1997). This is the same process required by the Constitution for
passing any bill into law. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
75. The Act provides other detailed rules and procedures governing the consideration of any
disapproval bill. See 2 U.S.C. § 691d (1997).
76. See 142 CONG. REC. S2930 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. McCain); see
also supra text accompanying note 42.
77. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 691(b)(1-3) and 691d(7) (1997). The President may also refer to the
statement of managers accompanying the bill or to dollar amounts in another law which mandate
that some portion of the amount provided in the bill be allocated to a specific program, project, or
activity. See id. For example, the fiscal year 1996 Agriculture Appropriations Act allocated
$49,846,000 in special grants for agriculture research. The Conference Report contained tables
and charts which appropriated the $49,846,000 into lesser amounts corresponding to individual
research programs: for example, $3,758,000 for Wood Utilization Research in Oregon, Missouri,
North Carolina, Minnesota, Maine and Michigan. In such a bill, the President could only line out
the dollar amount of budget authority specified in the law or the report, which is the entire
$49,846,000 or the entire $3,758,000. He has no authority to use his discretion to decrease a
portion of either sum. CONG. REc. S2930-31 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen.
McCain).
78. See 142 CONG. REC. S2930.
79. The second limitation, the elimination of the federal deficit, is not explicitly stated, but
since the Line Item Veto Act mandates that all of the rescissions must reduce the federal deficit,
the President cannot have item veto authority if there is no deficit. See 2 U.S.C. § 691 (1997).
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specifically grants members of Congress standing to sue.80 Since the con-
stitutionality of the line item veto was in question during the debate over
the bill, Congress enacted an expedited judicial review process to resolve
the issue. An order from the District Court is reviewable by direct appeal
to the United States Supreme Court.81 Further, both the District Court and
the Supreme Court have a duty to advance their dockets and expedite the
disposition of any matter challenging the Act.
8 2
C. The Initial Constitutional Challenge: Byrd v. Raines8
3
As a result of the expedited judicial review provisions, by the begin-
ning of July 1997; the Line Item Veto Act had already completed its
whirlwind tour through the Federal District Court for the District of Co-
lumbia and the United States Supreme Court, despite the fact that it did not
become effective until January 1, 1997. Surprisingly, however, the ques-
tion of its constitutionality remained unresolved.
4
One day after the Line Item Veto Act became effective, six lawmak-
ers85 filed a District Court action challenging its constitutionality. 6 On
April 10, 1997, District Court Judge Thomas Penfield Jackson found that
the plaintiffs satisfied the requisite standing 7 and ripeness88 requirements,
and held that the President's line item veto authority was an unconstitu-
tional violation of the separation of powers.89
80. See 2 U.S.C. § 692(a)(1) (1997). "Any Member of Congress or any individual adversely
affected by [this Act] may bring an action, in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia, for declaratory judgment and injunctive relief on the ground that any provision of this
[Act] violates the Constitution." Id.
81. See 2 U.S.C. § 692(b) (1997).
82. See 2 U.S.C. § 692(c) (1997).
83. 956 F. Supp. 25 (D.D.C. 1997) overruled by Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.Ct. 2312 (1997)
(hereinafter "Byrd").
84. Prior to the 1997 suit challenging its constitutionality, the Line Item Veto Act faced an-
other lawsuit filed before the law became effective. The case, National Treasury Employees
Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423 (D.C. Cir. 1996), was dismissed. The court held that the
union lacked legal standing to sue because the law was not yet in effect and therefore, could not
be used against the Union, and it had not been injured. See id. at 1430-32.
85. The six plaintiffs who filed suit were Senators Robert C. Byrd (D-W. Va.), Mark 0.
Hatfield (R-Or.), Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.), Carl Levin (D-Mich.) and Representatives Henry
A. Waxman (D-Cal.) and David E. Skaggs (D-Colo.). The defendants are Franklin D. Raines,
Director of the Office of Management and Budget and Robert E. Rubin, Secretary of the Treas-
ury. See Byrd, 956 F. Supp. at 27 n.l.
86. See id. at 27.
87. The standing inquiry examines whether the plaintiff is the proper party to bring the suit.
See Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976).
88. A ripeness inquiry evaluates whether an injury has occurred or is "certainly impending."
Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158 (1990).
89. See 956 F. Supp. at 30-32, 38. Judge Jackson explained that the line item veto power
violated the careful design of the Constitution because Congress, the branch in which the Consti-
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Pursuant to the Line Item Veto Act's expedited review provision,9°
the defendants appealed the District Court's ruling directly to the Supreme
Court. Because of the Line Item Veto Act's importance in the budgeting
process, the Court granted certiorari, 9' heard oral arguments, and rendered
its decision92 prior to leaving for its 1997 summer recess.
Surprisingly, the Supreme Court did not address the constitutionality
of the line item veto power. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, speaking on
behalf of the majority,93 announced that the Court lacked jurisdiction to re-
view the substantive provisions of the Line Item Veto Act because the ap-
pellees did not satisfy the necessary Article III "case or controversy" re-
quirement that is the threshold requirement for federal court jurisdiction. 94
Contrary to the District Court ruling, the Supreme Court found that
the appellees failed to establish standing to sue, one element of the case or
controversy requirement.95 "To meet the standing requirements of Article
III, '[a] plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defen-
dant's allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the re-
quested relief.' ' , 96  Congress cannot abolish the Article III standing re-
quirement by statutorily granting standing to a plaintiff who would not
otherwise have a right to sue.97 In Raines, the Supreme Court's examina-
tion of the plaintiff lawmakers' right to sue was one of first impression. 98
The Court relied upon two cases and the "historical practice" of legislators
and executive branch members who experienced injury in their official ca-
tution vested "all legislative Powers," relinquished to the President its legislative authority to re-
peal laws or portions of laws he does not like. Id. at 36. The constitutional scheme allots the
President only a veto over legislation. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. Congress' ceding of such
vast powers to the President was "revolutionary" and turned the division of Legislative and Ex-
ecutive Branch responsibilities on its head. See 956 F. Supp. at 37-38.
90. See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
91. Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.Ct. 1489 (1997).
92. Raines v. Byrd, 117 S.Ct. 2312 (1997).
93. The majority consisted of Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, O'Connor, Kennedy, Thomas,
Ginsburg and Souter, who wrote a separate concurrence. The dissenters were Justices Breyer and
Stevens.
94. See Raines, 117 S. Ct. at 2317 (citing Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans
United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982)); 117 S. CL at 2322.
95. See id. at 2317 (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992)); 117
S. Ct. at 2322.
96. See id. at 2317 (quoting Allan v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,751 (1984)).
97. See id. at 2318 n.3 (citing Gladstine, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 100
(1979)).
98. See id. at 2318-21. The District Court based its finding of standing on the District of
Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals' repeated recognition of Congressmen's standing to challenge
measures that affect their constitutionally prescribed lawmaking authority. See Byrd, 956 F.
Supp. at 30. The District Court relied upon the following cases: Michel v. Anderson, 14 F.3d
623, 625 (D.C. Cir. 1994), Moore v. United States House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946, 950-
53 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985), and Vander Jagt v. O'Neill, 699 F.2d
1166, 1168-71 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 823 (1983). See id.
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pacity,99 in concluding that no legislative standing exists for a diminution
of a lawmaker's legislative power. °°
First, the Raines Court stated that in Powell v. McCormack,'10 its
finding of legislative standing for a congressman who had been excluded
from the House of Representatives (and consequently lost his salary) failed
to support a similar finding for appellees.1 2 First, the appellees were not
individually selected from the House or Senate for unfavorable treatment
as was Representative Powell.10 3 All members of the House and Senate
share equally in the harm to their official authority resulting from the
President's line item veto power. Second, unlike Representative Powell,
who was deprived of his House seat after his constituents elected him, the
appellees made no assertion that they were deprived of a personal entitle-
ment.1 4 "[A]ppellees' claim of standing [was] based on a loss of political
power, not loss of any private right, which would make the injury more
concrete."105 Thus, where there is an absence of personalized harm, no
legislative standing exists.
Second, the Court discussed Coleman v. Miller,1' 6 the only case in
which standing for legislators (albeit state legislators) claiming an institu-
tional injury has been upheld by the Supreme Court.1 7 In Coleman, a
deadlocked senatorial %vote which would ordinarily prevent passage of an
amendment was disregarded, and the State Lieutenant Governor's vote
ratified the amendment. 08 The Coleman Court held that the legislators
who voted against the amendment had standing to sue because their votes,
which would have been sufficient to defeat the proposed amendment, were
nullified.' °9 As to the Line Item Veto Act, however, the Raines Court
found that the appellees' votes "were given full effect[;] [t]hey simply lost
that vote."110 Further, in the future, the Line Item Veto Act will not void
99. See 117 S.Ct. at2318-21.
100. See id. at 2321-22.
101. 395 U.S. 486,496 (1969).
102. See 117 S. Ct. at 2318.
103. See id.
104. See id. The Court "attach[ed] some importance to the fact that appellees have not been
authorized to represent their respective Houses of Congress in this action, and indeed both
Houses actively oppose their suit." Id. at 2322. In the accompanying footnote, the Court notes
that in Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 544 (1986), "members of collegial
bodies do not have standing to perfect an appeal the body itself has declined to take." Id. at 2322
n. 10.
105. Id. at2318.
106. 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
107. See Raines, 117 S.Ct. at 2318-19.
108. See 307 U.S. at 436-37.
109. See id. at438.
110. Raines, 117 S.Ct. at 2320.
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appellees' votes as the Coleman legislators' votes had been because Con-
gress may repeal the Act or exempt an appropriations bill or provision
from the Act.11 Therefore, according to the Court, Coleman "provide[d]
little meaningful precedent for appellees' argument."'1 12
In addition to the lack of legal precedent to support appellees' claim
for standing, the Court revealed that historically "in analogous confronta-
tions between one or both Houses of Congress and the Executive Branch,
no suit was brought on the basis of claimed injury to official authority or
power." 113 As examples, the Court cited the one-House veto provision at
issue in INS v. Chadha1 14 and the Tenure of Office Act passed in 1867.115
Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Majority, noted that while
strict compliance with the jurisdictional requirement has always been in-
sisted on, in this case the standing inquiry was "especially rigorous [be-
cause] ... reaching the merits of the dispute would force [the Court] to de-
cide whether an action taken by one of the other two branches of the
Federal Government was unconstitutional."'1 16 The majority opinion said
the Court had to put aside its "natural urge to proceed directly to the merits
of this important dispute and to 'settle' it for the sake of convenience and
efficiency."
1 17
As for future suits, the Court stated that its decision did not foreclose
suit by an appropriate plaintiff.18 Justices Souter and Ginsburg, although
finding that standing was a debatable question, concurred with the major-
ity's holding. They asserted that because an appropriate plaintiff would
bring suit after the heated politics had subsided, it was worthwhile to "re-
solve doubts about standing against the plaintiff invoking an official inter-
est. ,1 19
As the concurring Justices expected, in the months following the Su-
preme Court's decision, President Clinton grasped the first opportunity he
was presented to exercise his line item veto authority and, thus, opened the
111. See id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at2321.
114. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
115. See id. at 2321-22.
116. See 117 S.Ct. at 2317-18. Traditionally, the Court has said that the standing doctrine
"must be employed to prevent litigants from drawing federal courts into unnecessary conflict with
coordinate branches." LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, § 3-14, at 109
(2d ed. 1988). In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984), the Burger Court announced that the
standing doctrine was "'built on a single basic idea-the idea of separation of powers,' recog-
nizing 'the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic society."' TRIBE, §
3-14, at 109.
117. 117 S.Ct. at2318.
118. See id. at2322.
119. Id. at 2325. (Souter, J., concurring).
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
doors for those harmed to bring a legal action. On August 5, 1997, the
President signed legislation to balance the budget by the year 2002 and to
deliver $152 billion in tax cuts.12" He then became the first American
President to exercise line item veto power by canceling three separate
items from the tax bill.121 He stated that his vetoes, excising "unjustified"
tax breaks costing an estimated $615 million over five years, would "en-
sure that national interests prevail over narrow interests.' ' 2 2 Less than two
months later, on October 6, 1997, President Clinton used the line item veto
for the first time on an appropriations bill.123 He "axed" 38 projects, to-
taling $287 million, from the fiscal year 1998 Military Construction appro-
priations bill.124
Assuming that Congress does not overrule the procedures provided by
the Line Item Veto Act, those who stood to benefit from or were harmed
by any of the cancellations may bring suit under the expedited review pro-
vision of the Line Item Veto Act. Potential challengers, both individuals
and organizations, initially reacted with caution to the President's decision
and were undecided as to whether to bring a judicial challenge. 125 As of
January 1, 1998, three plaintiffs had filed lawsuits challenging the Line
Item Veto Act's constitutionality.
126
120. Associated Press, Clinton Still Unsure About Line Item Veto New Budget Bill Set for
Signing Today, FLORIDA TODAY, Aug. 5, 1997, at 3A.
121. The tax provisions excised by President Clinton are as follows: (1) a measure permit-
ting financial services firms to defer taxes from foreign income earned in 1998, (2) a tax deferral
for transactions involving sales of food processors to farm cooperatives, and (3) a special excep-
tion allowing the state of New York to continue claiming federal dollars for Medicaid. See
Jackie Calmes and Gregg Hitt, Clinton Uses Line Item Veto For First Time, WALL ST. J., Aug.
12, 1997, at A3.
122. John F. Harris, Clinton Wields New Authority, Vetoing 3 Items; President Strikes Down
Tax and Spending Provisions, WASH. POST, Aug. 12, 1997, at Al.
123. Clinton Wields Line Item Veto to Strike 38 Military Projects, CONGRESSDAILY, Oct. 6,
1997, available in 1997 WL 11443841.
124. See id.
125. See Veto Power Clinton's Decision Sets Up Historic Confrontation, Paves Way For
Legal Fight Over Separation of Powers, SUN-SENTINEL Fr. LAUDERDALE, Aug. 12, 1997, at IA.
On Tuesday, September 23, 1997, as a result of a deal negotiated with the White House, the
House Ways and Means Committee approved a bill to modify and restore two tax provisions that
were the targets of President Clinton's first use of the line item veto. Jerry Gray, White House
and Congress Reach Deal to Restore Two Tax Breaks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 1997, at A18. The
deal between the Executive Branch and Congress concerns tax benefits for farmers' cooperatives
and entities in international finance. See id.
126. Vandana Mathur, Mark Felsenthal & Chris Hanna, Line Item Veto Law Face Court
Challenges By Three Groups, 66 U.S. LAW WEEK 2253 (1997). The three separate suits-New
York City v. Clinton, No. 97-2393, filed October 16, 1997; Snack River Potato Growers, Inc. v.
Robert E. Rubin, No. 97-2463; and National Treasury Employees Union v. United States, No.
97-2399, filed October 16, 1997-were consolidated for hearing in the District Court for the
District of Columbia. See id. See also Potato Growers Challenge Veto Power, MILWAUKEE
JOURNAL SENTINEL, Oct. 22, 1997, at 9; Susan Page, Line-Item Veto Alters Political Landscape,
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D. Who Will Be a Proper Plaintiff in the Imminent Supreme Court
Case?
According to the Supreme Court in Raines 127 in order for any federal
court to take a suit challenging the constitutionality of the Line Item Veto
Act, the plaintiff must establish that "claimed injury is personal, particu-
larized, concrete, and otherwise judicially cognizable." 128 However, as to
the standing requirements, future plaintiffs will face differing hurdles, de-
pending upon whether they challenge a canceled tax or appropriations pro-
vision.
The difference in the plaintiffs' burdens lies in proving causation. A
plaintiff suing to contest a canceled tax benefit ("tax plaintiff") will find it
easier-relative to a plaintiff challenging a non-military appropriation-to
prove that the cancellation was a personal injury with a direct harm. The
direct link is established between the tax plaintiff and the lost tax benefit
simply by showing that the plaintiff stood to gain from the tax. For exam-
ple, one tax benefit canceled by the President was a Subchapter F tax pro-
vision allowing investment companies and brokerage firms which trade se-
curities abroad to defer tax liability until such profits are repatriated. 29
Without much effort, a brokerage firm that would have received a tax
benefit should be able to show harm.
The task of proving causation will be more difficult for a plaintiff
challenging a canceled appropriation provision for a non-military project.
For example, if the President canceled a $20 million highway repair plan
for the San Francisco Bay Area, which potential plaintiffs could make an
adequate showing that they had been harmed by the President's veto?
Residents and highway users of the San Francisco Bay Area and the citi-
zens of California would lose the benefit of safer transportation ways. In
addition, contractors would lose out on the federal dollars because the state
would have passed along the funds in the form of construction projects. In
such a case, two difficult questions must be answered to prove a concrete,
personalized injury: (1) who is a harmed plaintiff(s) and (2) can the plain-
tiff(s) demonstrate injury.
USA ToDAY, Oct. 31, 1997, at 6A. In the two suits brought by New York City and the Snack
River Potato Growers, the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, on February
12, 1998, ruled that the Line Item Veto Act was unconstitutional. 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1295.
Per the expedited review clause in Line Item Veto Act, the suits are on direct appeal to United
States Supreme Court. The third lawsuit by the National Treasury Employees Union was re-
solved in a negotiated settlement approved by the District Court. See id.
127. 117 S.Ct. 2312.
128. Id. at2318.
129. See The White House: Press Briefing by Bob Rubin, Frank Raines, Gene Sperling, M2
Presswire Aug. 12, 1997, available in 1997 WL 11443515.
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Identifying a proper plaintiff to challenge a vetoed military appro-
priations provision is an even more difficult task. For example, one large
spending project that President Clinton has excised would have appropri-
ated a $19.9 million set-aside for a new wharf and the demolition of two
buildings at the Norfolk Naval Shipyard in Virginia.130 Another allocation
in the 1998 Military Construction bill canceled by President Clinton was a
$10 million project to consolidate a B-lB squadron operations facility at
Dyess Air Force Base in Texas. 131 In these matters, the President, as
Commander-in-Chief of the nation's armed forces, has broad authority to
make decisions affecting national security and military spending that falls
within that sphere. Thus, it is questionable whether there exists any plain-
tiff who can bring suit to contest such a veto. Once a plaintiff satisfies the
standing requirements, the plaintiff must characterize the line item veto as
a power that the President cannot constitutionally exercise. Parts 11-V
below present three potential characterizations of the line item veto and
discuss the constitutionality of each characterization.
I. The Line Item Veto Power as Presidential
Lawmaking Authority
The line item veto power may be viewed as the authority for a Presi-
dent to make laws. This section examines whether the Constitution per-
mits the President to hold such power independent of the Legislative
Branch, and if not, whether Congress, the nation's lawmaking body, can
delegate legislative authority to the President.
A. The Constitutionality of Presidential Lawmaking
The President's item veto authority may be characterized as the power
to legislate, which includes amending or repealing existing laws as well as
introducing legislation. An exercise of the line item veto power constitutes
a repeal of law because any item in an appropriations or tax bill that the
President rescinds invalidates Congress' mandate in that law. Such rescis-
sions also amend laws because the cancellations reconfigure the substance
of the appropriations or tax bills. In essence, the Line Item Veto Act al-
lows the President to use the line item veto power to repeal, rewrite, or
amend laws unilaterally, without fulfilling the constitutional requisites of
130. See Hill Riled By Latest Line Item Vetoes, CONGRESSDAILY, Oct. 7, 1997, available in
1997 WL 11888689.
131. See id.
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bicameralism and presentment. 132 The President is thus effectively em-
powered to independently legislate and control spending.
13 3
The power of a President to legislate unilaterally to expend funds is
unconstitutional. The Constitution vests legislative powers in Congress
13 4
and executive powers in the President. 135 In Chadha,36 the Supreme Court
discussed the proper balance of legislative power between the Executive
and Legislative Branches as it considered the constitutionality of the Im-
migration and Nationality Act's 137 one-house congressional veto provi-
sion.138 The Chadha Court stated that the bicameralism and presentment
clauses imposed by the Framers were not an "abstract generalization.' 13 9
Of the two, the Framers were more concerned with presentment because
Congress' authority is to be most "carefully circumscribed." 14  They pur-
posely gave the President a "limited and qualified power" to repeal pro-
posed legislation by veto so that he could "check whatever propensity a
particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-
considered measures.'' Thus, according to the Court, the Framers never
intended the President to have any legislative function beyond his role of
approving or rejecting entire bills presented to him by Congress. 42
The line item veto power, however, reorders the constitutional duties
of the President and Congress in the fiscal arena.'43 With regard to appro-
priations, the President has the constitutional duty to see that all funds are
spent properly. This power emanates from the duty to "take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed.... "144 As for Congress, Article I, Section 8
of the Constitution states: "Congress shall have Power to lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
132. See Michael J. Gerhardt, The Bottom Line On The Line-Item Veto of 1996, 6 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 233,237 (1997).
133. See 142 CONG. REc. S2963 (daily ed. March 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Levin).
134. See U.S. CONST. art. L While the Founders vested Congress with most legislative pow-
ers, they did give the President an executive veto over legislation. See id. at § 7, cl. 3.
135. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
136. 462 U.S. 919.
137. 8 U.S.C. § 1254(c)(2).
138. See 462 U.S. at 945-48.
139. Id. at 946.
140. See id. at 947-48.
141. Id.
142. See id. at 948.
143. During the 20th century, Congress has statutorily increased the President and Executive
Branch's role in the budgeting and appropriations process by enacting legislation such as the
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, the Antideficiency Act of 1950, and the Impoundment
Control Act of 1974. See Louts FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POwER 35, 154-57, 198-201
(1975) [hereinafter FISHER, SPENDING].
144. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.', 145 The Fram-
ers intentionally designated Congress, the reresentatives of the nation's
people, to control the nation's purse strings. By using the line item veto
to cancel spending for certain projects or programs, the President reorders
Congress' spending priorities without constitutional authority to do so.
The Line Item Veto Act cannot grant the President the power to direct the
nation's spending.
Not only is presidential lawmaking contrary to the text of the Consti-
tution, but by giving the President the power to legislate and control the
nation's treasury, the Line Item Veto Act violates a fundamental tenet of
our nation: the separation of powers. The Framers purposely structured
the United States government with three discrete and separate branches in
order to disperse power within it and prevent tyranny of the majority or
concentration of power in one dictator.147 As to control over the nation's
finances, James Madison, stated that the "power over the purse, may in fact
be regarded as the most.., effectual weapon with which any constitution
can arm the immediate representatives of the people, for obtaining a re-
dress of every grievance, and for carrying into effect every just and salu-
tary measure." 148 The Line Item Veto Act, however, gives the President
access to the nation's purse strings, a power which the Framers purposely
delegated entirely to the Legislature. The President thus impermissibly
alters the balance of powers between the Executive and Legislative
Branches in his favor when he exercises his item veto power; he will both
legislate and execute the laws.
Analysis of possible Supreme Court approaches to the separation of
powers reveals various alternatives, but they can be categorized mainly as
a "formalist" approach and a "functionalist" approach. 149 A formalist ap-
proach treats the Constitution as granting each branch distinct powers and
setting forth the maximum degree to which the branches may share such
powers. 5° In contrast, a functionalist approach considers the distinctions
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
146. THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (James Madison).
147. In Federalist No. 47, James Madison wrote: "The accumulation of all powers, legisla-
tive, executive, judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether he-
reditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny."
THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (James Madison).
148. THE FEDERALIST No. 58 (James Madison).
149. See Krasnow, supra note 17, at 609-10.
150. See 142 CONG. REC. S2948 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan)
(citing Mar. 27, 1996 letter from Professor Michael J. Gerhardt to Sen. Moynihan). See, e.g.,
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919.
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between the branches as being imprecise. 15  Although the Court has not
established any uniform approach to evaluating separation of powers ques-
tions, 152 the current Supreme Court will likely adopt a formalist view if the
line item veto authority is characterized as legislative power. During the
past two decades, when the Court has been posed with questions pertaining
to the lawmaking provisions of Article I, Section 7, it has been quite literal
in its textual interpretation. For example, in Chadha,5 3 the Court abided
strictly by the bicameralism and presentment clauses in Section 7 to find
that a one-house legislative veto was unconstitutional.' 54
It is crucial in maintaining our representative government that the bal-
ance of powers remains unaltered. It seems likely that if the President has
the authority to make laws and control the nation's purse strings through
the Line Item Veto Act, the Court's application of the formalistic approach
will reveal that the line item veto violates the separation of powers doctrine
and is therefore unconstitutional.
The line item veto power not only violates the separation of powers,
but has a concrete negative effect as well; it diminishes Congress' ac-
countability. Without the line item veto, Congress is answerable to its
constituents and the general public for the contents of all federal legisla-
tion, whether in the form of a single bill or an omnibus appropriations act.
By delegating line item veto authority to the President, Congress has
shifted some of its accountability to the Executive Branch. If the Line Item
Veto Act withstands constitutional challenge, Congress will have reduced
its responsibility for any special interest legislation passed. Every portion
of an omnibus appropriations bill that the President does not veto will be
legislation for which he will have to take personal and political responsi-
bility., 5 Congress has given the President and his staff a large and poten-
tially overwhelming task of evaluating each omnibus appropriations bill
and excising, within the allotted five-day review period, all the special in-
151. See 142 CONG. REC. S2948 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan)
(citing Mar. 27, 1996 letter from Professor Michael J. Gerhardt to Sen. Moynihan).
152. See Krasnow, supra note 17, at 609.
153. 462 U.S. at 919.
154. See id. at 944-59.
155. At the end of President Clinton's first "budget season of wielding the.. . line item
veto[,]" the American public evaluated his use of the new power. Associated Press, Line-Item
Veto Scorecard: $1.9 Billion Over 5 Years, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 1997, at A21. "The president
used the line item veto to eliminate only $491 million from more than $800 billion in spending in
the 13 appropriations bills for the 1998 fiscal year. That amounts to less than one-tenth of one
percent, leaving billions of dollars' worth of low-priority, unnecessary or wasteful projects."
John McCain, Line-Item Pork New Presidential Authority Isn't Achieving Its Purpose, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Dec. 15, 1997, at 19A.
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terest legislation that may have been inserted.156 The reduction of congres-
sional accountability and the potential for placing overwhelming responsi-
bility on the President illustrate the real dangers of significantly shifting
the balance of powers.
Moreover, contrary to assertions by members of Congress in support
of the Line Item Veto Act, the line item veto will not necessarily solve the
problem of pork-barrel legislation. Senator Larry Craig (R-Idaho), for ex-
ample, asserted that the Line Item Veto Act is "good public policy" be-
cause it "fine tune[s]" the legislative process and forces Congress "to do its
homework in the kind of detail that [it had] not been producing in the
past."'157 While Congress may be more careful in legislating for fear that
the President will publicly announce and ridicule any favors for special
interests that he finds, there are still means to circumvent the Line Item
Veto Act's provisions and successfully pass pork-barrel legislation. For
example, members of Congress could negotiate their votes on important
issues with the President in order to prevent veto of projects favorable to
their constituents. Congress can also provide a tax benefit for 101 separate
entities that fall outside of the category of "limited tax benefits" that the
President can veto pursuant to section 691 of the Line Item Veto Act. As
Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) has openly admitted, "every Congressman
or Senator wants to get projects for his or her district. Everyone wants not
only their fair share of the Federal pie for their States, they want more....
It is an institutional problem."'158 In light of this behavior, Congress may
be motivated to utilize the Line Item Veto Act to shift a portion, if not all,
of the blame to the President for excesses in appropriations where he fails
to excise a specific item. In the end, Congress could use the Act to portray
the President as the culprit responsible for the large federal deficit. Con-
gress should not be permitted to hide behind a self-made curtain. Instead,
it should be forced to confront the American public and give a full account
of its deeds. This is another tangible benefit provided by separation of
powers and another illustration why the Act violates that constitutional
doctrine.
156. Even if the President uses all of the ten days which he is constitutionally given to evalu-
ate a bill before signing it, fifteen days may be inadequate when the President is confronted with
an eleventh-hour omnibus appropriations bill. Note that the ten day period comes from Article I,
Section 7 which provides that "any Bill [which] shall not be returned by the President within ten
Days ... after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if
he had signed it ... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
157. 141 CONG. REC. S4224 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Sen. Craig).
158. 142 CONG. REC. S2931 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. McCain).
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B. The Constitutionality of Congress' Delegation of Lawmaking Powers
to the President
Not only does the Constitution not permit the President to possess
legislative authority in the guise of line item veto power, but Congress is
constitutionally prevented from allowing the President such power. In Ar-
ticle I, Section 1, the Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative Powers
herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States."' 59 From
this broad language, the United States Supreme Court derived the nondele-
gation doctrine: Congress may not constitutionally abdicate its legislative
powers to another branch of government. 16° Nevertheless, the Court has
long recognized that the nondelegation doctrine does not prevent Congress
from seeking assistance, within proper limits, from its coordinate
branches.161 The Constitution has never been regarded as preventing Con-
gress from having the flexibility and practicality necessary to perform its
functions. 62 The nondelegation doctrine merely bars Congress from relin-
quishing its responsibility in the federal government with respect to pri-
mary policy-making. 163 Congress does not violate the Constitution by leg-
islating in broad terms and leaving a certain degree of discretion to
executive or judicial actors. So long as Congress articulates "standards"'164
or an "intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [act]
is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation
of legislative power."'
165
159. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
160. "[T]he integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by the Constitu-
tion" mandate that Congress generally cannot delegate its legislative power to another branch of
government. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892). See also Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293
U.S. 388,421 (1935); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, 295 U.S. 495,529 (1935). The
principle of separation of powers underlies the doctrine of nondelegation. See Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 371 (1989). "The nondelegation doctrine is rooted in the principle of sepa-
ration of powers that underlies our tripartite system of Government." Id.
161. See Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator of Wage & Hour Div. of Dep't of Labor, 312
U.S. 126, 144 (1941). "[Tlhe delegation of legislative powers to executive and administrative
agencies is essential to the modem administrative state." Wolfson, supra note 15, at 845. There
are many reasons why Congress may be unable to carry out the entire job of legislating and must
assign officials to assist with some of its duties: for example, (1) "[a] field may be too technical
or fast-changing for Congress to regulate [it] directly;" or (2) "implementing a policy may de-
mand such attention to detail that... [Congress] would become so mired in specifics that it could
not proceed to matters of general importance." Id. at 846.
162. See Panama Refining, 293 U.S. at 421.
163. See Wolfson, supra note 15, at 845.
164. Although during the New Deal era, the Court invalidated congressional delegation of
legislative power to federal officers in two cases, the Court in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 423 (1944), overturned long standing precedent by allowing delegation when Congress lays
down standards to guide the delegee.
165. J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). The Court has
affirmed standardless delegations in limited instances where there was a transfer of power to an
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Since the era of the New Deal, the Court has not invalidated any of
Congress' broad transfers of lawmaking power to federal officials or agen-
cies. Upholding such grants of power, the Court has adduced to its 1944
decision in Yakus,166 which held that Congress may delegate legislative
functions if it sets forth the underlying policy, prescribes the method of
achieving the objective, and lays down standards to guide the delegee's
actions. 167 The Yakus standard has proven to be almost toothless, as the
Court has upheld statutes that provided minimal guidance for executive or
administrative officials.1 68 Some examples include: a statute allowing the
Federal Communications Commission to regulate radio broadcasting ac-
cording to "public interest, convenience, or necessity;" 169 a statute author-
izing the Attorney General to temporarily add a controlled substance to the
schedule denoting illegal substances when it is "necessary to avoid an im-
minent hazard to the public safety; ' 170 a statute empowering the War De-
partment to recover "excessive profits" earned on military contracts;171 and
a statute permitting the Price Administrator to fix "fair and equitable"
commodities prices.
1 72
In addition to the Yakus requirements, the Court in Loving v. United
States173 specifically held that even congressional delegation of lawmaking
authority to the President himself is not unconstitutional. 74 In Loving, an
Army private challenged Congress' power to delegate to the President the
authority to prescribe aggravating factors in cases where members of the
nation's armed forces commit capital murder.1 75 After examining the leg-
islative history of Article I, Section 8, Clause 14, the Court found that
Clause 14-which empowers Congress "[t]o make Rules for the Govern-
ment and Regulation of the land and naval forces"-does not grant Con-
entity possessing substantial inherent authority in the regulated field. See e.g., Wolfson, supra
note 15, at 859 n.44. One example is Congress' delegation to the President of authority which
touches on foreign affairs. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304
(1936). Likewise, the Court has allowed Congress to give Indian tribes the authority to regulate
the sale of alcoholic beverages on reservations without providing any standards to accompany the
power. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556-58 (1975). A standardless justification
in that area was sufficient because the Court found that the tribes exercised autonomous power
over "internal and social relations of tribal life." Id at 557.
166. 321 U.S. 414.
167. Id. at 424-25.
168. The Court has "upheld, without exception, delegations under standards phrased in
sweeping terms." Loving v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 1737, 1750 (1996).
169. National Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190,216-17,225-26 (1942).
170. Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166-67 (1991).
171. Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 746, 778-86 (1948).
172. Yakus, 321 U.S. at 426-27.
173. 116 S.Ct. 1737 (1996).
174. Id. at 1748.
175. Id. at 1740.
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gress an exclusive, nondelegable power to determine military punish-
ments.' 6 Because the Court "give[s] Congress the highest deference in or-
dering military affairs," it did not read the clause to restrict Congress'
flexibility to exercise or share power as the times demand.
1 77
Given that Congress may assign lawmaking powers to the President
and the Yakus standard is almost toothless, it is unlikely that Congress
failed to meet the requirements when it enacted the Line Item Veto Act.
Congress clearly articulated its goal of decreasing the federal deficit and its
intent that the line item veto power serve as a means of achieving that
goal.7 It also provided "standards" that the President may use in exer-
cising his line item veto authority (e.g., how to determine the amount of an
item to veto). 9 Thus, Congress' delegation of lawmaking power to the
President in the Line Item Veto Act is arguably proper and constitutional.
While the Constitution permits Congress to delegate lawmaking
power to the President, however, the Line Item Veto Act does more than
merely delegate. When Congress delegates its authority to make laws to an
administrative body or an executive officer, it gives the recipient permis-
sion to enact legislation necessary to carry out Congressional directives.
For example, in establishing the Environmental Protection Agency, Con-
gress empowered the agency to pass any statutes needed to achieve Con-
gress' goal of preserving the nation's environment, air, land and sea.
180
Congress' delegation of legislative power does not authorize any recipient,
including the President, to overrule Congress' mandates. The Line Item
Veto Act, however, permits just that. With the line item veto power, the
President "cancels" specific appropriations and taxing measures previously
deliberated upon and passed by Congress. Therefore, while Congress can
give the President some power to legislate, the Line Item Veto Act is not
an appropriate delegation of lawmaking authority since the President can
legislate independently.
Because the line item veto authority fails to constitute a proper con-
gressional delegation of lawmaking power, it cannot stand as legitimate
presidential legislative authority. The President does not constitutionally
possess any power to make laws and the exercise of such powers violates
the separation of powers doctrine. Hence, the Line Item Veto Act is un-
176. See id. at 1748.
177. Id.
178. See 2 U.S.C. § 691 (1997).
179. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 691, 691e, 691f (1997). Alaska Senator Stevens stated: "I think we
have a clear delegation of authority to the President for a specific purpose, and it is for the pur-
pose of deficit reduction. That is what will pass constitutional muster .... " 142 CoNG. REC.
S2957 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Stevens).
180. Administrative Procedure Act § 553,556-57 (1997).
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constitutional if it indeed gives the President the authority to make laws
and control the nation's purse strings in violation of the constitutional
framework.
IV. The Line Item Veto Power as an Effectuation of the
President's Article I Veto Authority
Rather than allowing the President to legislate, the Line Item Veto
Act may simply allow the President to exercise the veto power explicitly
provided by Article V81 Although the text of the Constitution does not in-
clude the word "veto," 182 the presidential power is implied from the pre-
sentment clause which states:
"Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives
and the Senate, shall, before it becomes a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if
not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it
shall have originated .... 183
However, Congress currently employs tactics which prevent the President
from fully utilizing his veto power. By presenting the President with elev-
enth-hour omnibus appropriations bills' 84 or spending packages which are
filled with pork-barrel legislation or nongermane riders,185 Congress im-
pairs the President's ability to veto discrete legislative measures. Without
the line item veto power, the President risks shutting down the government
if he chooses to veto an entire bill in order to prevent a single item from
being enacted. 18 6 Although this procedure may be perceived as part of the
regular checks and balances of the Constitution, in the context of line item
181. See Judith A. Best, The Item Veto: Would the Founders Approve?, 14 PRESIDENTIAL
STUD. Q. 183, 188 (1984) (asserting that "[i]t is reasonable to assert that the Founders would not
find the line item veto to be a dangerous innovation but rather a rehabilitation of an original and
essential check and balance"); Alan J. Dixon, Line-Item Veto Controversy, 64 CONG. DIG. 259,
282 (1985) [hereinafter Dixon, Controversy] (stating "I say restore because the truth is that the
presidential veto is now a much weaker weapon than it once was").
182. See Gerhardt, supra note 132, at 235; see also ROBERT J. SPIZER, THE PRESIDENTIAL
VEro: TOUCHSTONE OF THE AMERicAN PRESIDENCY 17 (1988) (noting that "[n]owhere in the
Constitution does the word veto appear, even though the paragraph that describes it is the second
longest in the document").
183. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
184. See Russell M. Ross & Fred Schwengel, An Item Veto for the President?, 12
PRESIDEMAL STUD. Q. 66, 77 (1982) (asserting that "[w]hen appropriations bills are rushed
through Congress in the closing days, and perhaps hours, of the legislative session, as is often the
case, the President has, for all practical purposes, no choice at all").
185. Nongermane riders are amendments to an appropriations bill which are unrelated to the
underlying subject of the bill. See LOUIS FISHER, THE POLmcS OF SHARED POWER CONGRESS
AND THE EXECUtrIVE 20 (1993) [hereinafter FISHER, POLITICS].
186. See Krasnow, supra note 17, at 584 n.8.
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veto authority, it may not serve as a check because Congress' current leg-
islative tactics prevent the President from exercising his veto effectively.
The Framers wanted the President to have the veto as a tool to protect
the presidency from encroachment by the Legislative Branch 87 and to pre-
vent the enactment of harmful laws. 188 Modem legislative practices have
frustrated the Framers dual purpose in giving the President veto author-
ity.189 The techniques employed by Congress intrude on the Executive
Branch and hinder the President from using his veto to halt the passage of
laws that only benefit special interests. Although the Framers were aware
that the process of legislating involved special interests, the modem legis-
lating methods were not foreseen.1tg
The line item veto effectuates the President's executive veto by effec-
tively dividing up omnibus appropriations and tax bills into a manageable
size. Whereas the President had to veto entire bills previously, he may
now selectively cancel singular items which represent benefits for special
interests. Congress utilizes the line item veto to inject the executive veto
with the power that the Founding Fathers intended the President to have in
the legislative scheme. "The Congress shall have Power... To Make all
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers vested by this Constitution .... ."191 Thus, this argument
suggests that the line item veto power does not infringe upon the powers of
the legislative branch and does not violate separation of powers. Arguably,
it serves to maintain the balance of power between the Legislative and Ex-
ecutive branches.
In determining the constitutionality of the line item veto power as an
effectuation of the President's Article I veto, the Supreme Court could take
a functionalist approach 92 since it has recently applied such an analysis to
the issues of separation of powers in the executive-legislative setting.
Such an approach would likely countenance an argument that the Consti-
tution permits the use of an item veto to effectuate the President's veto. In
187. See James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, 66, 628-29
(Ohio U. Press 1966) (1840); THE FEDERALIST No. 73, at 492, 495 (Alexander Hamilton)(Jacob
Cooke ed., 1961). See also FISHER, POLITICS, supra note 185, at 19.
188. See FISHER, POLTICS, supra note 185, at 19.
189. The intent is discerned from James Madison and Alexander Hamilton's writings. See
James Madison, Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787, 66, 628-29 (Ohio U. Press
1966) (1840); THE FEDERALIST No. 73 (Alexander Hamilton).
190. See Dixon, Case, supra note 15, at 221 (stating that "[t]he legislative tactics that have
eroded the President's veto power were uncommon when the Constitution was written"); Richard
A. Givens, The Validity of a Separate Veto of Nongermnane Riders to Legislation 39 TEMP. L.Q.
60, 60 (1965) (asserting that "[tihere is no evidence that the practice of attaching riders was fore-
seen at the time of the writing or adoption of the Constitution").
191. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
192. See supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text.
Chadha,193 Justice Powell rejected the formal approach in his concurring
opinion. He remarked that the Constitution does not establish precise
boundaries between the branches, 194 but rather, fixes them "according to
common sense and the inherent necessities of governmental co-
ordination." 195  Likewise, Justice Jackson, in his concurrence in
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,196 refrained from adopting any
approach based on the notion that the scope of each branch's powers is
clearly delineated. He felt that the Constitution distributes power among
the three branches, but allows the political system to mold the separate
branches into an operative and effectual whole.
197
In the judicial-legislative and executive-legislative realm, the Su-
preme Court has recently applied this functional analysis to separation of
powers questions. In Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural Products,'9
the Court evaluated the extent of congressional intrusion into the judici-
ary's dominion. Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, rejected strict
"doctrinaire reliance on formal categories."'199 At issue in Thomas was
whether Article Ill of the Constitution forbids Congress from electing
binding arbitration with only limited judicial review as the method for re-
solving disputes arising from the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Ro-
denticide Act.20° The Court stated that in determining whether Congress
has exceeded the limits of its authority in enacting a given statute, "regard
must be had, as in other cases where constitutional limits are invoked, not
to mere matters of form but t6 the substance of what is required."20'
The Court similarly refused to employ a formalistic analysis in Com-
modities Futures Trading Commission v. Schor.2°2 Instead, it reviewed
various factors to determine the effect of a congressional scheme to grant
the Trading Commission authority to adjudge claims on the federal judici-
, 20
ary's constitutionally assigned role.203 The Court found that the power
193. 462 U.S. 919.
194. See id., at 962 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 121 (1976) (per curiam)).
195. Id. at 962 (citing J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 406).
196. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
197. See id. at 635. "While the Constitution diffuses power to better secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It
enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Id.
198. 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
199. Id. at 587.
200. Id. at 571.
201. Id. at 586 (citing Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 53 (1932)).
202. See 478 U.S. 833, 851 (1986) (citing Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587, 590).
203. As the Court explained, "[a]mong the factors upon which we have focused are the extent
to which the 'essential attributes of judicial power' are reserved to Article I courts, and, con-
versely, the extent to which the non-Article I forum exercises the range of jurisdiction and pow-
ers normally vested only in Article Ill courts, the origins and importance of the right to be adjudi-
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given to the Trading Commission did not pose any genuine threat under
separation of powers principles.2 4 Further, the Court stated that "bright-
line rules cannot effectively be employed to yield broad principles applica-
ble in all Article I inquiries. Rather, due regard must be given in each
case to the unique aspects of the congressional plan at issue and its practi-
cal consequences in light of the larger concerns that underlie Article 1rn." 205
Although these two cases address congressional intrusion into the province
of the judiciary, the separation of powers analysis used by the Court is no
less applicable to similar intrusions into the executive branch.
In Morrison v. Olson,2°6 the Court reviewed the effect of the Special
Division court's" appointment of a special prosecutor on the balance of
2"8power between the Executive and Legislative Branches. The Court
stated the powers that Congress held under the Ethics in Government Act
did not include any power to control or supervise an independent coun-
sel.2°9 Congress' role was confined to duties generally recognized as leg-
islative: receiving reports or other information and overseeing the inde-
pendent counsel's activities. -2 10  While the Court acknowledged that the
Ethics in Government Act affected the Attorney General's (and therefore,
the President's) control and supervision of the independent counsel's in-
vestigation and prosecution, it found that the Ethics in Government Act did
not disrupt the proper balance between the coordinate branches because
the Attorney General retained supervisory powers and the power to remove
the independent counsel for "good cause. '211 Thus, the Court held that
there was no "dange[r] of congressional usurpation of Executive Branch
functions. 212
Recent applications of the functional approach to separation of pow-
ers cases suggest that the line item veto power (when characterized as a
means to return the President his executive veto authority) may be found
constitutional. The theme of these cases has been the preservation of
cated, and the concerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article 111." 478
U.S. at 851 (citing Thomas, 473 U.S. at 587,589-593).
204. See id. at 857.
205. Id. (citations omitted).
206. 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
207. A court of Special Division is a branch of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia and consists of three circuit court judges or justices appointed by the United
States Chief Justice. See id. at 661 n.3.
208. See id. at 685-97. Congress provided for this in Title VI of the Ethics in Government
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 591-599 (1982, Supp. V). Congress first enacted the Act in 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-521, 92 Stat. 1867. The Act has been amended twice. See Pub. L. No. 97-409, 96 Stat. 2039;
Pub. L. No. 100-191, 101 Stat. 1293.
209. See 487 U.S. at 694.
210. See id.
211. See id. at 695-96.
212. Id. at 694 (citing Schor, 478 U.S. at 856).
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checks and balances among the branches in accordance with Madison's
pronouncement that "the constant aim [of the Constitution] is to divide and
arrange the several offices in such a manner that each may be a check on
the other."213 Under the functionalist approach, the Court would examine
the recent developments that have disabled the Executive Branch check on
the Legislative Branch. In view of the legislative methods which Congress
currently employs, the Court could find that the Line Item Veto Act merely
reestablishes the balance of power that existed before Congress limited the
effectiveness of the President's veto.
Despite the fact that the line item veto may correctly adjust the bal-
ance of power between Congress and the President, however, the line item
veto cannot serve as an effectuation of the President's veto because it vio-
21lates the legislative procedure set out by the Constitution. 14 To determine
the proper legislative framework, the Court will likely employ the formal-
istic, rather than the functional approach because the Constitution has spo-
ken clearly on the issue. Article I, Section 7 provides detailed procedures
regarding the process of legislation-from the introduction of a bill to the
legislative deliberation and possible executive veto of the bill. Instead of
abiding by the constitutional requirement that Congress introduce and
amend legislation, the Line Item Veto Act gives the President such powers.
Once the President vetoes an item from a bill, he invalidates Congress'
mandate as to that item of the particular bill and essentially rewrites and
amends the contents of the legislation passed by Congress. In the presence
of explicit textual guidance, the Court is unlikely to adopt a functionalist
view, but will probably remain faithful to the language of the Constitution.
Hence, if the line item veto power functions as an effectuation of the
President's executive veto, it is a violation of the legislative scheme set out
by the Constitution. Although the Court could employ a functionalist ap-
proach to uphold the Act, it is more likely to follow the explicit language
of the Constitution and find the line item veto to be a violation of the leg-
islative scheme created by the Founding Fathers.
V. The Line Item Veto Power as Presidential
Impoundment Authority
Another way of characterizing the President's line item veto power is
as the power to impound funds. This Note defines impoundment authority
213. THE FEDERALIST No. 51 at 322 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter, ed., 1961).
214. "[Ihe fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitat-
ing functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution.
Convenience and efficiency are not the primary objectives-or the hallmarks--of democratic
government...." Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
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as the power of a President to exercise discretion in executing appropria-
tions or tax laws. Under the Line Item Veto Act, once the President signs a
bill, he has the option of applying the funds for the legislated purpose(s) or
withholding the money by sending a special message to Congress.21s Thus,
the "practice of impoundment, by which Presidents selectively refuse to
spend appropriated funds, can be seen functionally as a line item veto un-
der a different name.
' 216
A. Historical Basis for Impoundment: Impoundment in the Absence of
Congressional Authorization
Assessment of the line item veto in this section must begin with an
analysis of the impoundment power itself. Although no explicit textual ba-
sis for impoundment exists in the Constitution, Presidents have consis-
tently employed the power. They have historically justified the use of im-
poundment power on three bases: (1) as Commander-in-Chief of the
nation's military, (2) by statutory authority, and (3) under the doctrine of
inherent power. 7
Presidents have justified impoundments by relying on the fact that
they are the nation's Commander-in-Chief, 218 and thus, have the constitu-
tionally enumerated power to refuse to carry out a law which threatens na-
tional security.219 In the early 1940s, Franklin D. Roosevelt refused to
spend over $500 million in funds for public works because the expendi-
tures would not contribute to the war effort.220 Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower, and Kennedy declined to build new weapons systems for
which Congress had allocated funds because they were not convinced of
their effectiveness. 1 The Presidents who have relied on their power as
head of the military argue that presidential authority exceeds Congress'
authority in the area of national defense.22
Additionally, Presidents have relied on statutory authority for im-
poundment, stating that in certain statutes, Congress approved the im-
215. See 2 U.S.C. § 691 (1997).
216. J. Gregory Sidak & Thomas A. Smith, Four Faces of the Item Veto: A Reply to Tribe
and Kurland, 84 Nw. U. L. REv. 437,447 (1990).
217. See Note, Impoundment of Funds, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1505, 1507-08 (1973).
218. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
and of the Militia of the several States, when called in to the actual Service of the United
States ....." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
219. The assertion that the Commander in Chief provision justifies impoundment in limited
circumstances can be challenged. However, it is beyond the scope of this Note to discuss the is-
sue. See Note, supra note 217, at 1509 n.14.
220. See supra note 217, at 1509.
221. See id.
222. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583-84,587.
Fall 1997]
poundment of funds necessary to decrease government expenditures. They
have traditionally relied upon the Anti-Deficiency Act of 1950,m the Em-
ployment Act of 1946,24 the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970,225 and
the public debt ceiling.226 In several instances where increased federal
spending has threatened the goals of these statutes that were designed to
restrict expenditures, the President, who is bound by the Constitution to
faithfully execute all laws of the United States, has withheld funds to re-
solve the conflicting statutory duties. President Nixon, for example, used
the Employment Act of 1946 to justify his impoundments during the early
1970s.2 7 In relevant part, the Employment Act states: "The Congress de-
clares that it is the continuing policy and responsibility of the Federal Gov-
ernment to use all practicable means consistent with its needs and obliga-
tions of national policy.., to promote maximum employment, production,
and purchasing power."2 8 President Nixon's staff stated: "The reference
to purchasing power permits the Administration to assert that it is only
giving effect through impoundment to a congressionally declared policy of
fighting inflation."229 Presidents have not relied on a statutory basis since
the enactment of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974 because it prevented the President from exercising any impound-
ment power.
230
Finally, Presidents have claimed a constitutional basis for impound-
ment in the inherent authority of their enumerated constitutional powers. 3
The Supreme Court has discussed the existence of the President's inherent
authority in several cases. In Cunningham v. Neagle, 232 the Court implied
that the President's duty to faithfully execute laws comprised not only the
"enforcement of acts of Congress or of treaties of the United States ac-
cording to their express terms," but also "the rights, duties and obligations
growing out of the Constitution itself, our international relations, and all
the protection implied by the nature of the government under the Constitu-
223. 31 U.S.C. § 665 (1970).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (1971).
225. Pub. L. No. 91-379, tit. II, 84 Stat. 799 (1970).
226. See 31 U.S.C. § 757b (Supp. 1972).
227. See supra note 217, at 1518-19.
228. 15 U.S.C. § 1021 (1971).
229. Hearings on Executive Impoundment of Appropriated Funds Before the Subcomm. on
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong. 94-96 (1971) (statement
of Casper Weinberger, Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget).
230. See Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat. 297 (1974). It is unclear whether the Congressional
Budget and Impoundment Control Act is constitutional. To date, no President has challenged the
constitutionality of that Act.
231. "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States .... U.S.
CoNsT. art. II, § 1.
232. 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
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tion.' ' 3  Further, in In re Debs,2 4 even in the absence of any statutory
authorization, the Court affirmed President Cleveland's power to seek an
injunction against the Pullman Strike which threatened interstate com-
merce and impeded delivery of the United States mail.2  The Court justi-
fied the President's authority on the ground that "the wrongs complained
of are such [that they] affect the public at large.'' 36 Finally, in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 7 the Court distinguished a presi-
dent's inherent powers in the domestic and international spheres. 238 The
Court stated that the President, when acting in the international arena, has
significant discretion in decision-making.239 With respect to internal af-
fairs, the Court in Curtiss Wright-issued its broadest 20th century ruling
in favor of inherent presidential authority. The Court declared that the
federal government can exercise powers "specifically enumerated in the
Constitution" and "such implied powers as are necessary and proper to
carry into effect [its] enumerated powers .... m Under such inherent
authority, Presidents have asserted that they may determine whether to
spend or hold funds which Congress had appropriated.
Since the broad holding of inherent presidential authority in Curtiss-
Wright, the Supreme Court has delineated some boundaries to the Presi-
dent's inherent authority in the domestic arena. In the context of deter-
mining whether the President was acting within his constitutional power
when he issued an order directing the Commerce Secretary to take posses-
sion and operate most of the nation's steel mills, the Court in
Youngstown 4 announced three views of presidential power.242 Justice
Black, in his opinion for the Court, articulated a formalistic approach to-
wards presidential power. He held that the President derives his power
from two sources: the Constitution and congressional authorizations for
the President to act.243 In Youngstown, the President did not draw his
power to issue the seizure order from the Constitution or from any act of
Congress, and thus, his action was unconstitutional; he had exceeded his
authority. Pursuant to Justice Black's position, the President has limited, if
233. Id. at 64 (emphasis in original).
234. 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
235. Id. at 564-72, 599.
236. Id. at 586.
237. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
238. Id. at 315.
239. See id. at 319-20.
240. Id. at 315-16.
241. 343 U.S. at 579.
242. There was a plurality in Youngstown. Justice Black delivered the Court's opinion while
Justices Jackson, Douglas, Burton, Clark, and Frankfurter concurred in separate opinions.
243. See id. at585.
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any, inherent authority to either act or not act, and must simply carry out
the orders of the Constitution and the Legislature, nothing more.
Justice Jackson, in his concurring opinion in Youngstown, established
three categories of presidential power to determine the validity of presi-
dential actions. The President possesses "maximum" authority when he
acts in accordance to express or implied congressional authorization. 2"
The President's power is at its "lowest ebb" when he takes measures in-
compatible with Congress' expressed or implied will.245 In such situations,
he can only "rely upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitu-
tional powers of Congress over the matter." 246 When there is an absence of
either a congressional grant or denial of authority, the President operates in
the third category, a twilight zone.247 A President in this predicament has
uncertain powers although he may share concurrent authority with Con-
gress in certain situations.
2A
Justice Frankfurter's concurrence, alternatively, endorsed the use of
historical pedigree to govern the limits of inherent presidential power. In
order to determine whether a President has the authority to act in a given
situation, he would look into history and see if Congress had acquiesced to
similar Executive Branch action for an extended time period.249 Thus, the
President essentially would have gained his power through the implied
powers he and his predecessors had historically amassed.
In summary, while all three Justices agreed that when Congress either
explicitly or implicitly disapproves of an action, the President has very
limited authority to act independently, they diverged on the question of the
President's power in situations of congressional silence. Under Justice
Black's perspective, the President is barred from acting when Congress is
silent on the issue because the President only executes the law. Justice
Jackson's theory, however, allows the President to act when Congress has
not spoken on a particular matter. Justice Frankfurter's approach of evalu-
ating historical practice falls in between Justices Black and Jackson's polar
views. Although Justice Black's opinion in Youngstown still stands, Jus-
tice Jackson's categorical framework seems to have become the accepted
view for analyzing presidential action.20 Given the categorical frame-
work, the President retains some inherent authority to impound funds in
situations of congressional silence.
244. See id. at 635.
245. See id. at 637.
246. Id.
247. See id.
248. See id.
249. See id. at 598-610.
250. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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B. Congress' Mandate to Impound
While Presidents have relied upon three different bases to justify their
impoundments in the absence of congressional authority, under the Line
Item Veto Act those bases are unnecessary because Congress has explicitly
authorized presidential impoundment. The issue is whether Congress can
give the President an executive authority to impound items within appro-
priations and tax bills. The President's power differs depending on
whether a bill appropriates funds or levies taxes.
Giving the President impoundment authority over taxing measures
conflicts with the explicit taxing scheme set out in the Constitution. Arti-
cle I, Section 8, Clause 1 states: "The Congress shall have Power To lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and pro-
vide for the common Defense and general Welfare of the United States.' '2" 1
The President has no role to tax; the taxing power belongs solely to Con-
gress. Consequently, the Constitution prohibits the President from im-
pounding and refusing to carry out a taxing provision that Congress has
mandated through law and prohibits Congress from abdicating its authority
to him.
The constitutionality of presidential impoundments of appropriation
items is contingent upon the method by which Congress authorizes the im-
poundment-act by act permission, or as a unilateral grant of power. In
the absence of any textual bar in the Constitution, Congress possesses the
power to authorize the President to impound funds in any spending bill that
it passes. Each piece of legislation authorizing impoundment would fulfill
the constitutional requirements of bicameralism and presentment. Thus, it
would be constitutional for Congress to empower the President to impound
items of spending act by act.
If Congress delegates broad impoundment authority to the President
in one fell swoop however, as it has in the Line Item Veto Act, then Con-
gress has exceeded its constitutional powers. This statement assumes that
impoundment is equivalent to lawmaking because characterizing im-
poundment as a mere execution of the laws would be a misnomer.
When Congress delegates impoundment authority across the board, the
President receives the power to nullify laws which is essentially the power
to rewrite laws. Thus, in giving the President his current line item veto
power, Congress overstepped its legislative authority because the im-
poundment power was given to the President through one law that alters
the legislative method for enacting future laws. The Constitution requires
251. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
252. If impoundment does not constitute lawmaking, it is a closer question whether the line
item veto is constitutional as impoundment authority.
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that Congress, in enacting legislation, must not only deliberate each bill in
both the House of Representatives and the Senate, but also present the bill
to the President for his consideration. 3 Congress' singular grant of im-
poundment authority to the President is unconstitutional in violation of the
formal requirements of the Constitution. Therefore, although Congress can
delegate an impoundment power to the President bill by bill, it cannot con-
stitutionally transfer a general grant of such power.
In the face of an explicit congressional decree and in the absence of
proper congressional delegation of impoundment power, the President's
impoundment power must independently withstand constitutional chal-
- lenge. One alternative means is to evaluate whether any inherent presi-
dential power exists for impoundment. The Supreme Court has directly
spoken on the question of whether the President has an inherent authority
to impound funds only once. In the 1838 case of Kendall v. United States
ex rel. Stokes,2 4 the Court stated: "To contend that the obligation imposed
on the President to see the laws faithfully executed, implies a power to for-
bid their execution is a novel construction of the [C]onstitution, and [is]
entirely inadmissible."' 'z 5 The Court further stated that it could not support
the doctrine of inherent authority because "if [it is] carried out in its re-
sults.... [it] would... cloth[e] the President with a power.., to control
the legislation of [C]ongress, and paralyze the administration of justice."5 6
Therefore, the only case addressing the issue indicates that the President
does not have any inherent power to impound.
Since Kendall, lower federal courts and the Supreme Court have
avoided consideration of the constitutionality of impoundment. Instead,
they have based their holdings on principles of statutory interpretation
2 57
The case of Train v. New York/2 8 the first modem impoundment case to
reach the Court, is an example of such a holding. In Train, the Adminis-
trators of the Environmental Protection Agency refused to allot $6 billion
253. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7.
254. 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
255. Id. at 613.
256. Id. The President's ability to impound funds also implicates a separation of powers is-
sue between the Executive and Judiciary Branches. A President could potentially use the line
item veto power to impound funds legislated for the judiciary to retaliate against its decisions or
influence decisions on pending cases. This question is beyond the scope of this Note. For dis-
cussions on this issue, see Robert Destro, Whom Do You Trust? Judicial Independence, The
Power of the Purse & The Line Item Veto, 44 FED. LAW. 26 (1997); Louis Fisher, Judicial Inde-
pendence and the Line Item Veto, 36 No.1 JuDGEs J. 18 (1997); Robert Pear, Federal Judges
Condemn Plans for a Line-Item Veto, N.Y. TIMRES, Mar. 27, 1996, at B8.
257. See Louis FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE
PRESIDENT 197 (1991) [hereinafter FISHER, CONFLiCTS].
258. 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
[Vol. 25:119
Fall 1997] THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF LINE ITEM VETO 155
appropriated by the Water Pollution Control Act.259 Relying on legislative
history, the Court skirted constitutional questions and held that the allot-
ment provisions in the Water Pollution Control Act were mandatory, and
the Administrator was required to allot the funds authorized.2m In reject-
ing the Administrator's authority to withhold funds, the Court impliedly
rejected any impoundment authority in a situation where the President
could not reasonably claim special powers as the Commander-in-Chieff 1
or an inherent power to conduct foreign affairs.262 The Court also rejected
constitutional authority for a President to impound funds in the face of a
congressional mandate to the contrary. During the twentieth century, the
United States Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled whether the President
has inherent powers which include the authority to exercise his discretion
in impounding funds.
Despite the fact that there is neither valid congressional authorization
nor inherent presidential power to impound, another rationale does exist to
support the use of the current line item veto power as impoundment
authority. Recognizing an impoundment power for the President may be
constitutional if such power merely reinforces his discretion in executing
laws. As stated earlier, the Constitution explicitly delegates the Chief Ex-
ecutive the responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully exe-
cuted .... ,,63 If the President believes it will not serve the ends of the law
to spend the money, then he cannot spend the money and faithfully execute
the law.26" Without discretion, the President would not be executing the
laws as intended by Congress; he would be relegated to performing the job
of a processing clerk.
Even though recognizing the line item veto power as a means to bol-
ster the President's discretion in executing laws is thus far the strongest ar-
gument for constitutionality, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court will
adopt such a theory and overturn the existing precedent against impound-
ment. An examination of American history reveals that for over a century,
259. Id. at 37-40.
260. See id. at 44-49.
261. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. "The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States .... Id.
262. The President's inherent authority in foreign affairs is based on Article II, section 2
which states: "[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Sen-
ate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate,
and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors ...." U.S.
CoNsT. art. II, § 2.
263. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 3.
264. The rationale can only be applied to appropriations bills and not taxation bills. As
stated previously, the President does not have any taxing authority unless it is given to him by
Congress.
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Presidents actively sought the power to impound funds.265 If previous
Presidents believed that they legitimately possessed impoundment author-
ity, they would not have continuously requested such power. In light of
historical practice, the Supreme Court will probably be disinclined to rec-
ognize presidential impoundment authority to reinforce the president's
duty to faithfully execute the laws.
Accordingly, without valid congressional authorization or proper con-
stitutional authorization, the President's impoundment authority is uncon-
stitutional because it violates separation of powers. The current Chief Jus-
tice of the Supreme Court, William Rehnquist, writing in his position as
Assistant Attorney General during the Nixon Administration, stated that
without proper congressional authority, presidential power to spend or save
money "is supported by neither reason nor precedent.... The Constitution
does not permit the President to repeal a law, to suspend a law, to ignore a
law, unless he chooses to veto the law itself.' 266 Accordingly, the im-
poundment power that the Line Item Veto Act confers on the President
violates the separation of powers because it gives the President the author-
ity to legislate and control the nation's spending.
267
Applying a formalist approach268 to the separation of powers question,
the Court will likely find that the Line Item Veto Act impermissably alters
the balance of powers, and is therefore, unconstitutional. The Court will
likely apply a formalist analysis because such an analysis is usually applied
to cases involving delegations from Congress to titular heads of a
branch. In this case, the delegatjon-is to thePr dent himself. Under a
formalist analysis, each branch has distinct powers, and the Constitution
establishes the branches' ability to share its powers.270 The text of the
Constitution and the intent of the drafters are controlling, and changed cir-
cumstances or broader policy outcomes are irrelevant to constitutional out-
comes.271 In recent years, the Court used this approach to strike down the
legislative veto in Chadha272 because it would have allowed one House to
take legislative action without complying with the procedures set forth in
Article I;273 to hold in Bowsher v. Synar274 that Congress may not delegate
265. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
266. 142 CONG. REC. S2964 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Levin).
267. See discussion supra in Part III, subsection A.
268. See discussion supra notes 149-151 and accompanying text for an introduction of the
formalist and functionalist approaches to separation of powers.
269. See 142 CONG. REC. S2948 (daily ed. Mar. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Moynihan)
(citing Mar. 27, 1996 letter from Professor Michael J. Gerhardt to Sen. Moynihan).
270. See id.
271. See id.
272. 462 U.S. at 919.
273. See id. at 956-58.
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executive budgetary functions to an official over whom Congress has re-
moval power;275 and to strike down in Washington. Airports Authority v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise276 the creation of a Board of
Review partially composed of members of Congress with executive veto-
like power over the decisions of the directors of the Metropolitan Wash-
ington Airports Authority. 7 Collectively, these holdings reveal that the
Supreme Court is reluctant to allow Congress to enact any legislation
which is inconsistent with formal constitutional procedures.
Under a formalist analysis of the Line Item Veto Act, the Court is
likely to hold that the impoundment veto power violates the Article I pro-
visions which give Congress the authority to legislate and control spend-
ing. The statement of the court in Sioux Valley Electric Association v.
Butz278 summarizes the situation: "Congress [can] confer[] a great deal of
power upon the President .... But... Congress [cannot go] so far... [as]
to confer upon the President the power to reassess and reorder Congres-
sional priorities ..... 279 Because the Act allows the President to nullify
congressional priorities in future matters, beyond the law conferring the
power, the Act violates the constitutional balance.
VI. Conclusion
Regardless of whether the line item veto power is characterized as an
impoundment power, a legislative power, or an effectuation of the Presi-
dent's executive veto, the Supreme Court is likely to find that the Line
Item Veto Act of 1996 violates the separation of powers established by the
Constitution. If the Court uses a functionalist approach to analyze the
separation of powers question raised by the line item veto power, it will
likely rule that the Line Item Veto Act improperly gives the President
power to legislate and control the nation's purse strings. The Court may
reach such a result by finding that Congress directly delegated legislative
power to the President. In the alternative, the use of the line item veto to
effectuate the President's executive veto is also unconstitutional because it
violates the legislative scheme set out in Article I. Finally, the Court could
find that while Congress can authorize presidential impoundments act by
act, Congress cannot give the President general impoundment power in the
guise of a line item veto power because it effectively allows the President
to legislate and control the nation's treasury without meeting the bicamer-
274. 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
275. Id. at 732.
276. 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
277. Id. at 277.
278. 367 F. Supp. 686 (D. S.D. 1973).
279. Id. at 697.
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alism and presentment provisions of the Constitution. Thus, all paths will
lead the Court to the same conclusion: the Line Item Veto Act is uncon-
stitutional because it violates the separation of powers doctrine.
Although Congress, and the President, may have had good intentions
in enacting the Line Item Veto Act of 1996 to correct its spending ex-
cesses, Congress' inefficiencies do not serve as an excuse to endow the
Executive Branch with extra-constitutional power. As Justice Brandeis
once explained, "[t]he doctrine of separation of powers was
adopted.., not to promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbi-
trary power. The purpose was, not to avoid friction, but by means of the
inevitable friction incident to the distribution of.. . governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy." 0 Perhaps
as currently organized, Congress is incapable of fiscal planning. Perhaps
necessity therefore requires that the President fill the void. But necessity
does not give birth to constitutional power. Congress must use a different
means to reach the desirable end; perhaps by promulgating rules to govern
its own self-interested behavior or by giving the President impoundment
power in each of its appropriations bills, or by initiating an amendment to
the Constitution to permit line item veto authority for the President. Re-
gardless of the necessity, the Constitution prevents Congress from sacri-
ficing the principle of separation of powers in order to correct its own
shortcomings.
280. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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